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ABSTRACT
Civil society has the potential to have a positive impact on social exclusion and health equity through ac-
tive monitoring and increased accountability. This paper examines the role of civil society in Bangladesh 
to understand why this potential has not been realized. Looking at two models of civil society action—
participation in decentralized public-sector service provision and academic think-tank data analysis—this 
analysis examines the barriers to positive civil society input into public policy decision-making. The role 
of non-governmental organizations, political, cultural and economic factors, and the influence of foreign 
bilateral and multilateral donors are considered. The paper concludes that, with a few exceptions, civil 
society in Bangladesh replicates the structural inequalities of society at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Civil society is a potential mechanism to refocus 
healthcare systems according to health rights and 
social welfare goals through mobilization of citizen 
demand for accountability and relevant service 
provision (1). The right to health is generally per-
ceived as the state’s obligation to deliver affordable, 
accessible health services to all and is enshrined in 
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights (2,3). The move-
ment for people’s participation in health is marked 
by the 1978 Alma-Ata declaration, which called for 
people’s participation in local health systems and 
their active involvement in defining priorities for 
scarce resources (4). The World Bank, which pro-
moted participation in all sectors with goals of de-
centralization and cost-cutting, further propelled 
this trend in the mid-1990s. Community participa-
tion is now widely expected to ensure that health 
systems are relevant, efficient, and sustainable, 
while public pressure is expected to improve quali-
ty, reduce inequity, and prevent corruption (2). 
This analysis reviews the literature on civil society 
in Bangladesh. We briefly discuss the need for civil 
society’s involvement in championing health equi-
ty and present the conflicting role of non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) in promoting health 
equity. We recount examples of large-scale efforts 
to engage civil society in raising the quality of 
healthcare. These examples follow two main paths. 
First, an increased emphasis on decentralization as 
a means of localizing policy-making, bringing de-
cision-making closer to disadvantaged groups, and 
encouraging local participation. A second mecha-
nism is academic and professional monitoring and 
analysis. Although such professionals are unlikely 
to be members of the poor or excluded, they may 
speak on their behalf. Data produced may suggest 
ways in which health resources could be equita-
bly distributed, correcting the elite capture often 
implicit in participatory decision-making. This 
analysis will examine examples of both of these in-
tervention mechanisms as they have occurred in 
Bangladesh in relation to health. In the subsequent 
section, social exclusion theory provides a useful 
framework for revealing the complex economic, 
social, and political challenges to the success of civil 
society in holding the Government accountable. 
BACKGROUND
Civil society in Bangladesh
Civil society is currently being emphasized as cen-Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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tral to the development process (5-7). Civil society 
is a broad concept that includes all voluntary orga-
nizations and associations that exist in the realm 
between, and are independent from, the state and 
the family (7,8). Mosque congregations, labour 
unions, professional associations, and NGOs are all 
factions of civil society, groups advocating for ‘pub-
lic interest’ or at least to extend their own inter-
ests and values. Public interest is naturally a highly 
contested domain, and the essential heterogeneity 
of civil society means that there will often be con-
trary factions. For example, labour unions and the 
business community may hold different opinions 
about which policies are likely to contribute to the 
greater good but both are important contributors 
to a rich civil society. Still, the impact and meaning 
of an active and diverse civil society is under de-
bate. Robert Putnam argues that weak civil society 
leads to a lack of civic engagement and social trust. 
However, active civil society can also be an indica-
tor of state or political weaknesses (7). 
Civil society’s potential for positive change is 
theorized to occur by increasing social associations 
(contacts), trust, and increasing engagement with 
governance infrastructure to ensure that people’s 
voices are heard and needs met. Ideally, civil socie-
ty organizations (CSOs) provide transparency and 
accountability of government services through 
peoples’ active scrutiny, advocacy, and monitoring 
to make service providers more responsive to the 
perceived needs of communities (9). Compared to 
state entities, CSO’s smaller bureaucracy provides 
them with more agility and an independent, criti-
cal space to play a stronger watchdog role. People’s 
direct participation in state functioning, through 
such civil society activities, ideally ensures that ser-
vice-delivery is relevant and efficient. In this man-
ner, civil society can act as a mechanism to comple-
ment and augment state functioning, bridging gaps 
between service providers and communities (10). 
As Bangura says, “If the public sector is to function 
effectively and enjoy widespread legitimacy, all 
groups in society must feel a sense of belonging, 
representation and shared interest in the institu-
tions that govern their lives” (11,12). The Health, 
Nutrition and Population Sector Plan (HNPSP) 
2003-2010 of the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare, Government of Bangladesh, also notes 
that civil society should “advocate and support the 
needs of the consumers” (13). However, civil soci-
ety in Bangladesh has not played this role. 
Defining civil society in Bangladesh: role of NGOs
Civil society is clearly locally specific, reflecting the 
economic, social, and political context. Civil socie-
ty in Bangladesh has been shaped by a rich his-
tory from the struggle for independence against 
the British (1947) and then Pakistan (1971), the 
language movement (1952), and the movement 
for democracy (1991) to the communal efforts at 
flood reconstruction (1988, 1998, 2004) (14). How-
ever, to begin to define Bangladeshi civil society, 
the unique role played by NGOs must first be clari-
fied. NGOs play an ambiguous role because their 
role often overlaps with the Government’s in terms 
of public service provision, and they often engage 
in market-based activities; so, they do not consis-
tently play a civil society role (6,7,15). That is, they 
are not consistently able to play the role of inde-
pendent monitor and advocate. It should be noted 
that other institutional and operational definitions 
of civil society gloss over these contradictions and 
include service provision as a non-problematic role 
for civil society (16,17). 
More importantly, although less common in Ban-
gladesh, NGOs play a critical role in building capaci- 
ty through social mobilization efforts and creating 
effective civil society actors. 
NGOs in Bangladesh emerged through the mo-
bilization for reconstruction in the aftermath of 
the War of Liberation in 1971 and the famine in 
1974, in the absence of a functioning state. Today, 
Bangladesh has thousands of NGOs, including 
advocacy groups and service organizations at the 
national and local levels. A recent count reported 
22,000, with approximately 1,250 receiving for-
eign funding. Seventy-eight percent of the villages 
in Bangladesh benefit from the presence of at least 
one NGO, and 35% of the population is directly 
provided with NGO services—either credit, educa-
tion, health or sanitation services (18). Why have 
NGOs flourished in Bangladesh? Davis (2001) cites 
weak state service provision, low levels of private 
foreign investment, and high levels of readily avail-
able bilateral and multilateral donor funding as the 
principal factors that created the political and eco-
nomic space for such organizations. The end result 
is a ‘franchise state’ where essential public services 
are run by NGOs funded by donors or the state 
(18,20).
It must be highlighted that the Bangladeshi NGOs 
that provide services are meeting urgent needs and 
generally doing an excellent job. Many of Ban-
gladesh’s development success stories, such as the 
microcredit and non-formal education, originated 
with NGOs (8). For example, Building Resources 
Across Communities (BRAC) has become one of Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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the country’s principal providers of health, educa-
tion, and credit in poor rural areas (19). Their inno-
vations have been replicated in other developing 
countries throughout the world (for example, the 
Grameen Foundation, a US-based charity which 
replicates the work of the Grameen Bank in other 
developing countries). 
When compared to equivalent government opera-
tions, NGO services generally run more efficiently 
and cheaply, with closer ties to communities. For 
this reason, donors often favour them as entry 
points to accessing communities in Bangladesh, 
especially since the 1980s (20). Often, NGOs run 
government projects for the Government itself. 
Indeed, as White points out, in the eyes of many 
villagers, NGO personnel are indistinguishable 
from government personnel; they are similarly part 
of ‘officialdom’ (21).
The effect of NGO service provision can operate 
in two ways: NGOs can raise the bar and, through 
competition, improve government service provi-
sion; or NGO provision can become a substitute 
for government provision, thereby reducing the 
demand for quality government services, caus-
ing government services to falter, their legitimacy 
undermined (22,23). Although a small number of 
NGOs devote themselves entirely to rights-based 
agenda, such as Nijera Kori and Samata, most NGOs 
in Bangladesh balance their advocacy role with 
service-delivery, the most influential example be-
ing BRAC (8). There are others that are only service 
providers. 
However, the role of service provision can distract 
NGOs from another important role—that of ad-
vocate and independent monitor of government 
activity. As service providers, they are less able to 
facilitate input of citizens into the policy process 
or hold the state accountable for its misdeeds and 
corruptions (6,15,23). This means that both NGO 
and government service providers are then spared 
from independent monitoring and accountability. 
All too often, in an effort to bolster successes and 
improve project reporting, the relatively easy-to-as-
sist marginally poor are targeted at the expense of 
the ultra-poor (8,10).
Inequity in health-sector spending
Civil society is suggested as a panacea for a wide 
range of ills; however, this paper is particularly 
concerned with engagement of civil society in the 
health system. In Bangladesh, typical of many parts 
of the world, health resources are distributed ineq-
uitably with a strong elite bias. A global analysis 
that included Bangladesh found that the wealthi-
est 20% of the population received over 26% of 
total financial subsidies provided by government 
health expenditure compared to the poorest 20% 
of the population who received only 16% (19). 
More specifically, in Bangladesh, the expenditure 
of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is 
almost equally divided among the poor and non-
poor. However, large expenditure for health by 
other ministries, such as the Ministry of Defense 
(on hospitals and clinics), skews spending towards 
rich and urban areas. Public expenditure for health 
is about equal for males and females but private 
expenditure greatly favours men. Furthermore, 
rural residents (approximately 80% of the popula-
tion) receive less than half the public spending on 
health, and only 12% of the rural population have 
access to public health at all (20). High levels of 
doctor absenteeism in rural areas and illegal user- 
fees, which inordinately affect the poor and exacer- 
bate the situation. Furthermore, negligence and 
unprofessional behaviour by service providers, 
poor maintenance of physical facilities, ‘leakages’ 
of resources, and long waiting-times plague provi-
sion of general health services. While there have 
been internal systems in place to ensure quality 
of care and accountability, they have been largely 
non-functional (2).
Despite attempts at health sector reform, citizens’ 
perceptions and usage of the system have declined. 
Between 1999 and 2003, public rating of govern-
ment health services as ‘good’ fell from 37% to 
10%; and the proportion of patients accessing gov-
ernment services fell from 13% to 10%, while un-
met need increased from 3% to 9% (24).
EXAMPLES OF ENGAGEMENT OF CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN HEALTH
The following three case studies provide examples 
of recent attempts to encourage civil society activi-
ty to increase accountability of the public health 
sector in Bangladesh, according to different mod-
els. All three reveal different potentialities and bar-
riers to participation of civil society, illustrating the 
complexity of the concept and its application in 
this unique political and social context. The first 
two cases, on stakeholder committees and village 
community groups, are based on earlier work by 
Mahmud (2,25). The last one, on more formal moni-
toring organizations, was researched by examining 
the documentation and reports from Health Watch 
and Bangladesh Health Equity Watch.Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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Case study 1: Stakeholder Committees, 
1998-2003
The Government of Bangladesh’s five-year plan 
—the Health and Population Sector Programme 
1998-2003—highlighted the importance of stake-
holder consultation and participation. The Minis-
try of Health and Family Welfare established stake-
holder committees of local resident service users 
to monitor the performance of public service pro-
viders at the local level. The ministry used NGOs 
for this purpose as they are well-networked at the 
community level. Nijera Kori, an NGO created in 
the 1980s, has a long history of social mobilization 
and was asked to set up local meetings in different 
parts of the country to provide poor people with 
an opportunity to provide input into how these 
groups might work. Eventually, Nijera Kori, Volun-
tary Health Service Society, BRAC, and Mahila Pari-
shad (four different NGOs) were given the task of 
forming community-level stakeholder committees 
with community representatives in nine districts 
on an experimental basis. 
The guidelines of the Government for group mem-
bership emphasized that members should come 
from different professional and social groups. The 
Nijera Kori groups were more specific: 50% of mem-
bership were women, two members were from 
landless groups, two professionals, one teacher 
and one service-delivery person, a union parishad 
member, and two representatives from the union 
stakeholder committees. At the community’s be-
hest, doctors and medical staff were excluded from 
membership to ensure no conflict of interest, al-
though they were occasionally invited to meetings. 
The recruitment process was reported to be trans-
parent and participatory (2). 
Nijera Kori provided training to its members in 
participation and deliberation and also provided 
institutional support when problems or hostilities 
with doctors arose. Possibly due to this capacity-
building, meetings for the stakeholder committees 
were structured and productive, and members par-
ticipated more or less equally, although in different 
ways. For example, ‘elite’ members appeared to be 
more comfortable discussing and debating points 
while the poorer members were more willing to 
mobilize and protest (2). 
Despite the success in establishing dialogue, the 
stakeholder committees lacked authority or politi-
cal clout to enact decisions, and they were given lit-
tle official recognition. General community aware-
ness about the committees and the opportunity 
it afforded to channel complaints and feedback 
about the healthcare system was low (2). Howev-
er, the stakeholder committees had a positive im-
pact on communities, including raising awareness 
about health facilities, and increasing community 
demand, putting pressure on doctors to arrive on 
time and stop levying illegal fees on patients. The 
new health policy launched in 2005 had no pro-
vision for supporting the stakeholder committees, 
and all those, except the ones run by Nijera Kori, 
were disbanded. 
Case study 2:  Village Community Groups 
As with case study 1, as part of the Health and 
Population Sector Programme 1998-2003, the Min-
istry of Health and Family Welfare decided to set up 
community-owned and managed primary health 
clinics in every village. These clinics delivered an 
‘essential services package’ that merged reproduc-
tive and primary health, which were previously 
separate programmes delivered through home- 
visits (26). Community ‘ownership’ was attempt-
ed by a requirement that the community donate 
the land for the health centre and share the cost of 
construction with the Government. The Govern-
ment provided salaries for the health workers. Cli- 
nic maintenance, such as cleaning and security, was 
to be provided by the community. In all, 10,000 
clinics were established (27). 
The elected Union Parishad Chairman, through 
local consultation, recruited members of the Vil-
lage Community Groups that would manage 
these centres. Unlike the stakeholder committees 
in the previous case study, the medical profession 
was represented in the groups. Unfortunately, the 
selection process was vulnerable to elite capture; 
membership was biased towards the better-off com-
munity members, limiting its acceptability to the 
wider community. Group members were often the 
relatives or close associates of the District Council 
Chairman. Understanding of the roles of group 
members was limited, even among group members 
themselves. 
Leadership and meeting structure was poor, and 
subsequently, little was achieved. In the absence 
of proper structure, structural inequalities were re-
produced in group functioning. As a result, women 
and the poor were given little opportunity to con-
tribute to discussion. Groups were given little of-
ficial support or credibility from the local upazila, 
undermining any decisions that were made. The 
groups were generally unwilling or unable to mo-
bilize resources, leading to deterioration in infra-Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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structure. Clinics were generally in disrepair with 
broken tubewells and leaking roofs. Supplies were 
always inadequate. By 2001, all 10,000 clinics had 
fallen into disuse (2,27). 
These models (case study 1 and 2) have been su-
perseded by the Health, Nutrition, and Population 
Sector Programme with Health Services User’s Fora; 
however, there are no data yet about their func-
tioning (13).
Case study 3: Bangladesh Health Equity 
Watch and Health Watch
Aside from efforts to include communities in poli-
cy decision-making, civil society can also provide a 
professional oversight and monitoring function. In 
this case, emphasis is placed not on ensuring locally 
relevant and inclusive decision-making but instead 
the injection of expert data collection and critical 
analysis into the policy process. This function is 
undertaken by academics, think-tanks, and NGOs 
with significant technical capacity. In the field of 
health, two such groups have emerged: Health 
Watch and Bangladesh Health Equity Watch.
Bangladesh Health Equity Watch (BHEW) emerged 
out of a global initiative—Global Health Equity 
Initiative—that started in Chile in 1999. In Bangla-
desh, it is coordinated by the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics, the Bangladesh Institute of Development 
Studies, BRAC, and ICDDR,B. the BHEW conducts 
a national survey of health equity, analyzes existing 
data with an equity focus, plays a strong advocacy 
function, and builds capacity in survey research. 
In 2005, in a similar gesture, with the same key 
players, a number of professional and civil socie-
ty groups came together to create a network that 
would regularly and systematically measure the 
performance of Bangladesh in terms of health to 
both inform policy and raise general awareness. 
Bangladesh Health Watch, housed at the BRAC 
School of Public Health, publishes a report every 
year focusing on specific themes and regularly re-
ports on key indicators. The first report, published 
in 2006, addressed the theme of health and equity. 
Bangladesh Health Watch is governed by an advi-
sory board consisting of key people in the field of 
development and health. A working group carries 
out the different activities of the Watch. 
Thus far, the impact of BHEW activities is limited 
to raising awareness about the extent of inequali-
ties and incorporation of an equity dimension in 
data collection, analysis, and reporting. The impact 
of such advocacy interventions can be difficult to 
measure. While such advocacy does not incorpo-
rate the participation of those in need, data-based 
decision-making may provide a corrective to the 
elite capture often present in attempts to incor-
porate civil society input into policy dialogue and 
may ensure that government decision-making ad-
dresses those most in need.
SOCIAL EXCLUSION ANALYSIS
What curbs the effectiveness of civil society in cre-
ating equity in Bangladesh, as in the case studies 
above? Social exclusion theory provides a frame-
work for understanding the challenges in the func-
tioning of civil society (28). The factors examined 
here are poverty, political capacity, patron-client 
relationships, political exclusion, and involve-
ment of donors. The factors have been determined 
through deduction from the literature and analysis 
of the above case studies. While these factors are 
described in isolation, they operate hand-in-hand 
to exclude certain populations from equal partici-
pation. 
Economic exclusion: situation of the poor
Poverty poses a significant challenge to citizen 
agency in Bangladesh. Poverty usually comes as a 
package deal: translating not only to mean lack of 
income but also lack of capabilities through lack 
of education, compromised health, and other fac-
tors. Poor people often have to work hard over 
long hours and may have little time for participat-
ing in activities that do not directly contribute 
to their livelihood—especially when the gains are 
often intangible and in the distant future. Partici-
pation in organized efforts of civil society involves 
the opportunity cost of productive work (23). Fur-
thermore, poor people in Bangladesh are also often 
made invisible and conduct their lives in informal 
spaces  relating  to  their  livelihood  pursuits,  such 
as savings groups and village factions (2). They do 
not have access to formal spaces where their voices 
can be heard by policy-makers and do not have 
the institutional literacy to navigate such spaces. 
The poor are also very vulnerable, and the threat 
of withdrawal of patron support is real, limiting 
the opportunities for poor people to participate in 
the activity of civil society. Poor people often see 
themselves as having little responsibility or capa-
bility for creation of a ‘good society’ (2). As in the 
case studies above, without careful capacity-build-
ing and clear guidelines, such as provided by Ni-
jera Kori, the poor were sidelined in participatory 
governance measures.Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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Political capacity
Activity of civil society requires appropriate skills 
on the part of the populace, CSOs, and the state. 
High  levels  of  poverty  and  the  concomitant 
low levels of education may limit capacity and 
confidence  to  challenge  state  actions,  since  the 
poor have limited knowledge of delivery mecha-
nisms and are unable to effectively assess techni-
cal aspects of service operations. The ability to 
critically engage with the state requires a level 
of institutional literacy that many poor people in 
Bangladesh do not have. One of the main barriers 
is lack of education, or literacy, to enable people to 
feel comfortable with, and critical of, modern insti-
tutions, such as the formal healthcare system. Edu-
cation Watch 2002 found that 41% of people aged 
over 11 years were literate; in addition, 37% of 
people in Bangladesh remain illiterate or semi- 
literate after completing five years of primary educa-
tion. Illiteracy clearly indicates a lack of capacity on 
the part of the populace to participate in ventures 
of civil society, according to the traditional defini-
tion (29). The prejudices surrounding illiteracy and 
poverty mean that policy-makers presume that the 
poor are unaware of their health needs and are best 
guided by the opinion of experts (30). 
To incorporate local perspectives into healthcare 
requires institutional change to enable service pro-
viders to build relationships and trust, listen, and 
respond to the needs of the community (11,22,31), 
such as was provided by Nijera Kori in the case 
studies above. 
Client-patron relationships 
Another significant barrier to engagement of civil 
society in health systems is the client-patron re-
lationships that structure the social fabric of pat-
rimonial countries like Bangladesh. People in 
Bangladesh have traditionally relied on vertical 
patron-client relationships for social protection 
(32). Such relationships leave the vast majority of 
the population at subsistence levels and a large 
minority in sub-poverty while providing un-
earned income, rent and/or power to patrons. The 
destitute, or the ultra-poor, are generally excluded 
from such relationships. In such a system, welfare 
of the people depends on the whim of the patron 
rather than any outside or objective standard; 
clients are rendered as passive beneficiaries of pa-
tron ‘favours’ rather than as citizens with rights 
(8). Funds allocated for the development of com-
munities are often squandered by politicians or 
bureaucrat patrons on maintaining such relation-
ships, hindering equitable human and economic 
development (8). This explains why the BHEW 
has little policy-impact; resources are distributed 
to vote banks, not according to needs established 
through epidemiological and demographic data. 
It also demonstrates why Village Community 
Groups are unlikely to be representative—posi-
tions are given as patron favours.
White (1999) argues that NGOs themselves have 
difficulty avoiding the role of ‘patron’ (21). NGOs 
are seen as sources of protection and a link to the 
wider world, for example, through the distribution 
of relief goods during floods. 
Why are these relationships so resilient? There is 
a common belief in Bangladesh that not everyone 
has equal rights; and, concomitantly, denial of 
rights is accepted as the natural order of things (2). 
This system is also supported by the absence of de-
pendable formal institutions; instead, people have 
to continue to rely on their patrons and benefac-
tors. The risk-averse poor (clients) are unlikely to 
violate such bonds and, thus, maintain a high level 
of loyalty to their patrons. Such relationships are 
further enabled by a general lack of accountability 
or transparency with clients having no redress or 
means to press the state into meeting its obliga-
tions. This hinders individual agency and action 
(2). State responsiveness is directed to patrons only, 
not the poor. 
Political exclusion
At the national level, the policy environment of 
Bangladesh is exemplified by the centrality of gov-
ernment officials—the policy elite—and is gener-
ally closed to other actors. The NGO Affairs Bureau 
(NGOAB) closely controls NGO activity and dis-
courages the formation of interest groups. Govern-
ment repression and NGOAB’s regulation of donor 
funds have been used for keeping NGO policy in 
check and specifically to prevent NGOs from en-
gaging in any political activity (18). Political activi-
ty is frequently conflated with partisan support 
for opposition parties. Oppositional civil society is 
seen as a threat to the state, and subsequently, poli-
cy elites have either co-opted or excluded civil so-
ciety actors. In 2004, a large NGO—Proshika—was 
shut down by the Government because they had 
mobilized the poor into pressuring the Govern-
ment for policy change. Leaders of Proshika were 
charged with sedition and corruption (18). In such 
an institutional environment, organized interest 
groups exist primarily only among the urban elite, 
and their capacity to impact the policy process is 
limited (33). Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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At the local level, Bangladesh’s most proximate 
form of government is the union parishad—and 
this is the level of government that impacts most 
directly on people’s lives. A recent World Bank re-
port noted that: “there is a great physical and psy-
chological distance between the lowest administra-
tive level where professional government services 
are found and the village communities where the 
need exists” (1). Little precise data are available on 
the extent to which this form of government is ac-
tually accessed. However, this is a very important 
question. The proximity people ‘feel’ to their gov-
ernment representative reflects the likelihood of 
political and civil society’s action. As case study 1 
demonstrates, political exclusion is compounded 
when participatory decision-making processes and 
outcomes are ignored. However, if people feel that 
their political representative is responsive to the 
needs of a community, they are more likely to seek 
positive change. This point is supported by research 
from rural North India, which suggests that civil 
society and a responsive political infrastructure are 
synergistic, each augments the other (12). Political 
exclusion and health are an important area for fur-
ther analysis in the context of Bangladesh.
Accountability to external parties
Donors have a strong role in the health sector in 
Bangladesh and have done so since independence. 
Bangladesh receives approximately US$ 2 billion 
per year in aid, 15% of which is channeled through 
NGOs. Since 1998, the World Bank has dominated 
a consortium of multilateral and bilateral donors in 
leading sector-wide reforms, such as the Health and 
Population Sector Policy 1998-2003 and the Health, 
Nutrition and Population Sector Policy 2005-2010. 
There are 31 bilateral and multilateral organizations 
supporting the activities of the Ministry of Health 
and Family Welfare, providing approximately 35% 
of expenditure (34). The many players with their 
own agenda and reporting requirements can lead 
to local priorities being subsumed. With donors, 
rather than tax-payers, providing such a large por-
tion of revenue in the health sector, accountability 
shifts from the citizen to the donor community 
(1,8). The strength and number of external actors 
means that there is no mechanism or leverage for 
civil society or citizenry to enforce accountability 
according to their own priorities and values (30). 
This undermines any ability to catalyze genuine 
social mobilization or change power structures 
(20). Health sector decisions are then made outside 
the domestic political system (20). This situation 
reflects and augments a significant disconnection 
between the policy-making process and the popu-
lace. 
DISCUSSION
The social exclusion analysis attempts to shed light 
on why efforts of civil society in health systems 
failed to effect any positive change in health eq-
uity in Bangladesh. The factors highlighted (pov-
erty, political capacity, patron-client relationships, 
political exclusion, and involvement of donors) 
do not just preclude civil society activity but also 
undermine the health system itself. For example, 
patron-client relationships determine access to af-
fordable, quality care for the poor (26). The factors 
described are both part of the problem and prevent 
a potential solution. 
The first two case studies demonstrate the structur-
al inequities, which are part of Bangladeshi society 
and are, therefore, easily reproduced by and within 
civil society ventures. This is also demonstrated 
by the co-existence of a large number of NGOs, 
a strong heritage of civil society activity (14) and 
chronic inequalities and poverty (15). 
This paper suggests that NGO service provision, 
while important, compromises the role as advocate 
and monitor and precludes accountability. Despite 
the constraints in playing a strong civil society role, 
some NGOs have played an important function 
through social mobilization efforts as demonstrated 
by Nijera Kori in case study 1. Through their efforts, 
NGOs can provide a space to build social capital-
relationships and networks beyond kin patrons or 
faction. Such networks can build capacity, generate 
knowledge, provide information, and empower the 
marginalized (35). For example, microcredit initia-
tives bring women together, and this has an effect 
on individual lives, society, and institutions. This 
building of social and community capacity may 
help create civil society actors and an environment 
in which these actors can hold the state or NGO 
service providers accountable. This kind of mobili-
zation may counter social exclusion.  
The benefits of an informed and inclusive partici-
pation can go beyond an improved health system 
and promote active citizenship. That is, active civil 
society within one sector will likely benefit other 
sectors as well. Amartya Sen argues that a politically- 
 engaged citizenry provokes government to respond 
more forcefully to underdevelopment and poverty 
(36). Research from rural North India suggests that 
social capital is associated with higher levels of po-
litical activity, stronger economic development, Schurmann AT and Mahmud S Civil society and health equity
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and a higher level of community harmony (12). 
Conclusion
While civil society has potential to positively affect 
health equity in Bangladesh, there are many factors 
that curb its ability to affect change and be inclu-
sive. After the social exclusion analysis of the case 
studies, it is difficult to conclude that civil society 
activity is a likely determinant of health equity. The 
case studies demonstrate that weak capacity, com-
plex internal politics, unclear official status, inter-
mittent funding, and general lack of awareness all 
undermine participatory civil society-based efforts 
in health. The community groups were unable to 
address structural factors that cause poor health 
and inequality, indeed traditional power structures 
were often reproduced. Barriers were also put in 
place by the medical establishment and policy-
makers, who were unwilling or unable to respond 
to directives and data provided. The case studies 
suggest that civic cooperation is likely to increase if 
only supported by state infrastructure, and if efforts 
are invested in building capacity with both com-
munity members (as demonstrated by Nijera Kori 
in case study 1) and state bureaucracy. 
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